International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
5 July 2010
Two years after the Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan established the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, the Commission held its final meeting in Vienna, 2-4 July 2010, to review progress made in meeting its mandate of re-energising global efforts towards the goal of eliminating nuclear threats, and to make some final recommendations as to how the Commission's objectives and achievements might be further advanced by others in the period ahead.
Looking Back: The Work of the Commission
2. The report of the Commission, Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, was delivered to the Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan by the Commission Co-chairs, former Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, in Tokyo in December 2009. Despite the diversity of disciplines and different geopolitical backgrounds of the Commissioners, the report represents the shared conclusions of all of them (see attachment for full list of Commissioners). The Commission was conscious throughout of its independence of any government, and sought to match, with hard-headed and realistic analysis and prescriptions, its unfailing conviction that so long as any nuclear weapons remain the world can never be safe.
Outreach and Advocacy
3. Since its launch the report has been presented to governments, scholars, media and civil society groups around the world — in all, over 8,000 printed copies of the report have been distributed to date, and many more have been downloaded from the Commission's website. The Commission arranged for the Synopsis of its report to be translated into Arabic, Chinese, French, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and Vietnamese. The report and related materials, including some 50 background research papers, are available through the Commission's website: www.icnnd.org.
4. The Co-chairs and Commissioners have engaged in an extensive program of meetings with national leaders and senior policy officials in over 30 countries to explain and seek support for the findings of the Commission. They have also made presentations to dozens of inter-governmental and civil society conferences and seminars, especially in the lead up to and at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in New York in May 2010.
5. Over the past two years the Commission has contributed to the resurgence of commitment by governments and civil society around the world to the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to the important debates which have occurred particularly in the context of the September 2009 United Nations (UN) Security Council Disarmament Summit, the negotiation of the New START Treaty, the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit and the NPT Review Conference. New undertakings have been made by a range of countries to take steps enhancing the non-proliferation system globally and, in the case of some nuclear-weapon states, to begin to adjust the settings of national strategic defence doctrines to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and add to transparency of nuclear postures.
6. The six months since the launch of the Commission report in December 2009 have been especially intense, punctuated by a number of landmark events which have tested international resolve. The Commission reviewed these developments.
New START Treaty
7. The Commission's report recognises the critical importance of leadership on the part of the two major nuclear powers, Russia and the United States (U.S.), who between them hold over 95 per cent of global nuclear weapon stockpiles. President Obama's speech in Prague in April 2009 and the parallel commitments of President Medvedev provided impetus for progress. A key result of the Prague commitments is the New START Treaty, with its significant reductions in the number of deployed strategic weapons, and vigorous verification provisions. The Commission believes the agreement is carefully calibrated to maintain the momentum towards a nuclear free world, and urges its early ratification by both parties. It is also encouraged that the treaty sets the stage for yet further cuts extending to sub-strategic weapons, and non-deployed weapons. The Commission remains convinced that the goal should be a further START agreement no later than 2015 which brings the total number of warheads down to no more than 1000 for each side, and hopefully much less, by the year 2020 (see Commission Recommendation 44). That should be followed by further rounds of negotiations designed to achieve by 2025 no more than 500 each (in the context of a global total of no more than 2,000).
Nuclear Security Summit
8. The Commission welcomes the outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April this year and the many practical pledges for early remedial actions that it encouraged. The Summit was tightly focused and addressed many of the elements identified in the Commission's report as deserving attention (see Commission Report Box 13.1). The Commission urges all countries to take steps in accordance with the Summit's Communiqué and Work Plan. It is vital that Summit participants with the capacity to do so should assist other countries needing technical assistance to ensure the security of all vulnerable nuclear materials by 2014, as part of the wider effort to prevent illicit nuclear transfers and enhance nuclear security globally.
Strategic Nuclear Doctrines
9. The Commission notes that in the last six months both Russia and the U.S. have published new reviews of their approach to the deployment and use of their nuclear arsenals — Russia's Military Doctrine of 5 February and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 6 April. While neither responds to the Commission's call for early movement on nuclear posture by adopting the principle that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter others from using them, the U.S. NPR does state that the “objective” is to make “the deterrence of nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons”. The Russian review provides some measure of transparency to Russian nuclear doctrine but has only been published in part, and it is to be hoped future iterations will contribute significantly to further reducing the salience of nuclear weapons.
10. The Commission welcomes the U.S. decision to make public the entire NPR, its undertaking not to develop any new generation of nuclear weapons, and its announcement that the U.S. will strengthen its long-standing negative security assurance by declaring that it will not use or threaten nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations (and even if faced with chemical or biological weapons attack). The Commission hopes that the new NATO Strategic Concept scheduled for publication later this year will adopt a revised doctrine which is at the very least in line with the new U.S. position.
NPT Review Conference
11. The Commission closely reviewed the achievements of the NPT Review Conference held from 3-28 May in New York. The Commission is gratified that its report was publicly recognised by many countries participating in the Conference as a source of ideas and arguments needed for a successful review, and that a majority of the relevant recommendations of its report were reflected wholly, substantially or in part in the Review Conference's agreed action plans. The Commission considers that the generally constructive atmosphere of the Conference and the commitment of all participants to ensuring a substantive outcome constituted an important reaffirmation of the centrality of the NPT to the objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation. It expresses its appreciation for the role of President of the Review Conference, Ambassador Cabactulan of the Philippines, and other senior officers of the Conference, for guiding the conference to a successful conclusion.
12. The Commission welcomes the Conference's detailed and balanced review of the three pillars of the NPT. The Final Document makes useful progress compared with the Final Document of the 2000 Review (and stands in striking contrast to the failure of the 2005 Review to adopt any substantive final document at all). The commitment of all states parties to the treaty has been reaffirmed and reinforced: none threatened to overturn the underlying bargains. The sustained formal and informal preparatory process, while still capable of improvement in future, ensured that the key issues and points of difference were identified and considered well in advance of the Conference itself. Given the constraints of the consensus decision making process, particularly in circumstances of deeply held and sometimes conflicting national security concerns, agreement was far from assured.
13. One of the most critical outcomes of the Conference was the endorsement of a set of practical steps to convene a conference in 2012, under the auspices of the UN and the U.S., United Kingdom and Russia, to be attended by all states of the Middle East, on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Such a possible way forward was specifically proposed by the Commission following detailed discussion at the Commission's regional meeting with Middle East countries in Cairo in September 2009 (see Commission Report 16.18-21 and Recommendation 41 (d)). Success in this process will clearly depend on all relevant states, in the lead-up to the conference, doing everything within their capacity to improve the security environment and reduce the potential for conflict within the region.
14. The Commission considers that while the Review Conference's action plan on disarmament fell short of the Commission's own widely-circulated 20 point “New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament” (see Commission Report Box 16-1), the general presentational approach of the Commission's proposal and many of the specific points therein were reflected in it, and that it was an advance on the 13 Practical Steps agreed in the 2000 NPT Review Conference, including in its committing of the nuclear-weapon states to report progress by 2014. Consistent with the Commission's recommendations, the Review Conference called for a rapid move to an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, a further diminishing of their role and significance, and consideration of further reducing their operational status.
15. All that said, the Commission strongly regrets that the agreed action plan fails to provide for at least a capping of all nuclear arsenals at their present levels and a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons use, and that the Commission's recommended indicative timeframes for progress were not adopted in any form.
16. The outcomes of the NPT Review Conference on non-proliferation issues were broadly consistent with the Commission's recommendations, but were weak in some crucial elements. The Commission welcomes the endorsement of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards, the more general calls to uphold the authority of the safeguards system and for all states to cooperate with the IAEA in resolving all cases on non-compliance, and the calls for all states to conclude the available arrangements essential for strengthened safeguards. It finds regrettable, however, that expressions of support for the IAEA were not accompanied by more specific commitments to strengthen the organisation's financial, human, physical and legal infrastructure.
17. The Review Conference failed, regrettably, to adopt the Commission's strongly held view that the Additional Protocol should become in effect the new international safeguards standard, and that its adoption be encouraged by being made a condition for all nuclear exports (see Commission Recommendation 5). It is also a matter for concern that the Conference was unable to agree on any action plan (of the kind proposed in Commission Recommendations 9-11) to address the problem of states withdrawing from the NPT after violating non-proliferation commitments while party to it.
18. The Commission reviewed developments relating to Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran — recognising the very different circumstances of the two countries — and repeats its concerns about both (see Commission Report 17.51-61 and Recommendations 59 and 60). The proliferation and other risks associated with Iran joining the ranks of the nuclear-armed states remain profound. The Commission affirms the critical need to seek a resolution of these highly threatening and damaging situations by negotiation in a manner consistent with non-proliferation objectives.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
19. Consideration by the NPT Review Conference of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy covered the range of issues considered in the Commission report. The Commission welcomes the Review Conference's reaffirmation that nuclear cooperation should be in conformity with all relevant articles of the NPT and the calls for parties to extend additional support for IAEA technical cooperation activities. The Review Conference also called for continued discussions on the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The Commission urges that priority be given to the development of such schemes, noting their potential to strengthen global confidence in the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their potential for addressing sensitive regional proliferation concerns (see Commission Recommendations 39 and 40). And it remains the Commission's view that proliferation resistant technology should be endorsed by governments and industry as an essential objective in the design and operation of nuclear facilities (see Commission Recommendation 34).
Countries not Party to the NPT
20. One unique contribution of the Commission not available to the NPT parties in preparation for the Review Conference was outreach to the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), making the case — if their early membership of the NPT itself could not be secured — for their participation in parallel instruments and arrangements which apply equivalent non-proliferation and disarmament obligations (see Commission Recommendations 17-19). But the Commission reaffirms its concerns about the terms of the exemption approved by the Nuclear Suppliers Group for India's nuclear programs, which did not require a strong new commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation objectives and measures. Its view remains that any future supply to non-NPT countries be on condition at least that the receiving state not conduct any nuclear test and implement a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapon purposes pending the entry into force of a fissile material production ban.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
21. The Commission expresses its concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has yet to enter into force. It particularly welcomes Indonesia's commitment at the outset of the NPT Review Conference to move now towards ratification, and calls, as did the NPT Review Conference, on all those other states whose ratification is specifically required urgently to bring this key disarmament and non-proliferation instrument into force. The Commission also notes and welcomes, as important contributions to the goal of universal CTBT coverage, recent accessions to the treaty by three other states.
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
22. The Commission expresses its deep concern at the failure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to commence work on a treaty to stop the production of nuclear materials intended for weapon use (FMCT — Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty), noting that the NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the necessity for such a treaty in strong terms: it would be a vital further step to engage all nuclear-armed states in the processes of disarmament and non-proliferation. The Commission calls on all states to resume cooperation on a substantive CD program of work, and pending conclusion of an FMCT all states to maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons use.
The role of the Nuclear-Weapon States and Other Nuclear-Armed States
23. The Commission welcomes the unequivocal recommitment of the NPT nuclear-weapon states — the U.S., Russia, UK, France and China — to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and calls on all other nuclear-armed states to respond positively to recent advances made by the U.S. and Russia in the New START negotiations. It welcomes steps taken by nuclear-weapon states to facilitate the full implementation of nuclear weapon free zones. And it welcomes the contribution to transparency made by the new United Kingdom government's announcement of its total arsenal size (225 warheads, with 160 operational and 65 non-operational), and its intention to conduct a review of its nuclear posture later this year. The Commission encourages the U.S. to take early action on the commitment in its NPR to engage in dialogue on nuclear disarmament issues with other nuclear nations, including China. The Commission calls on other nuclear-armed states to similarly engage in strategic dialogues to prepare the ground for ultimate disarmament negotiations (see Commission Recommendation 46).
24. The Commission notes continuing technological developments such as cyber warfare pose new threats to global security for nuclear-armed and non-armed states alike — and urge that more work be done to assess and address these threats.
25. Overall the Commission is heartened by the outcomes of the NPT Review Conference and the progress achieved by the U.S. and Russia on New START, and the Nuclear Security Summit. Failure of any one of these three key developments would have led to a serious loss of momentum in the environment of greater optimism which has been evident since 2009. It welcomed also the numerous other commitments made in recent months to the global disarmament and non-proliferation agendas, including for example those made by many individual participants at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. Together these provide a very solid platform for future work on these critically important issues.
26. However, major road blocks persist. The continued resistance of key states to ratification of the CTBT is a major obstacle to progress. Another obstacle is the failure of key states to conclude Additional Protocols to their safeguards agreements with the IAEA. And the failure to date, after more than a decade's effort, to commence FMCT negotiations is a further setback: the Commission urges that governments continue to press the issue at the highest levels with the holdout countries, and if necessary consider alternative means of advancing the negotiations. Further very strong concerns are the unresolved issues of Iran and DPRK, which continue to threaten the integrity of the non-proliferation system and ultimately its capacity to contain further breakout. Major efforts will need to continue to be made, across the full spectrum of disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses issues, to harness gains to date and move the situation forward.
27. The Commission believes that it has made a significant contribution to the change in the atmosphere for disarmament and non-proliferation over the last two years, having been part of the process of changing minds and building momentum in almost every capital. World leaders are now rhetorically committed to eliminating nuclear threats; few continue to defend nuclear weapons as a longer-term guarantee of national security or international stability. There is near universal agreement that the prospect of more nuclear-armed states is to be strongly opposed.
28. The Commission has been seen as one of the more vocal, consistent and widely cited champions of the revived conviction of the need to act sooner rather than later to remove nuclear threats. Nuclear dangers are back on national and international political agendas — and beginning to reappear on educational agendas as well — with a growing body of opinion conscious that something must be done.
29. The Commission hopes that its report will continue to inspire and maintain pressure for progress. The Commissioners will continue to strongly advocate its analysis and recommendations, and remain totally committed to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, in which every kind of nuclear threat has been eliminated once and for all.
Looking Forward: Recommendations for Sustaining the Momentum for Change
A Global Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
30. To focus and encourage the continuing interest of the whole international community — governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society alike — in eliminating nuclear threats once and for all, the Commission recommends the establishment of a Global Centre on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.
31. The primary role of the Centre would be to publish, and conduct advocacy related to, an annual “report card” evaluating the performance of both nuclear-armed and non-nuclear armed states, and relevant international organizations, against the action agendas in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document and, inter alia, the report of this Commission.
32. The other major role of the Centre would be to lead worldwide research aimed at refining and developing a model Nuclear Weapons Convention, with the object of having a fully worked through draft available to inform and guide multilateral disarmament negotiations as they gain momentum.
33. Such a Centre would most appropriately be structured as an independent non-governmental organization, with a governing board of distinguished international figures and a staff of highly qualified professional experts, all strongly international in character, financed by contributions from supportive governments, foundations and private donors. As well as a specifically focused research and advocacy mandate, it would have a clearly defined support role in relation to like-minded governments and NGOs, and a capacity and willingness to work cooperatively with the many existing research institutes, think-tanks and advocacy organizations already engaged in non-proliferation and disarmament issues.
34. The Governing Board of the Centre would comprise some fifteen individuals of high international standing, and representative of the world's major regions, who would meet at least annually to broadly oversee the work of the Centre, ensure the quality and independence of its product, and lend weight to its advocacy.
35. The Centre would desirably have an expert professional staff, of some twelve individuals, drawn from as many different regions of the world as possible. It would have the capacity to accommodate rotating visiting fellows, and aim to conduct much of its research through outreach arrangements with other relevant organizations rather than wholly in-house.
36. An important role and responsibility for the Centre will be to provide research and advocacy support, across the issues covered by its mandate, for governments and major NGOs around the world committed to eliminating nuclear threats and ultimately achieving a nuclear weapon free world.
37. Depending on the level and distribution of funding support received, the Centre could be situated in a single location, or distribute its resources around two, three or more states. Among those governments who, following consultations initiated by the Commission, so far have expressed possible interest in accommodating such a Centre, in whole or part, are Australia (in Canberra), Austria (in Vienna) and Switzerland (in Geneva). The Commission expresses the hope that appropriate arrangements for the establishment of the Centre, and support for its operations for at least the next five years, can be negotiated as soon as possible, so that the Centre can be fully operational from early 2011.
Global Leadership Networks
38. As emphasised in the Commission report's discussion of how to mobilize and sustain political will, new mechanisms need to be encouraged for harnessing public support and political leadership to make a reality of minimising nuclear weapons and eventually abolishing them. One critical need is for key civil society actors worldwide to integrate their efforts in the way that proved so successful with the Ottawa land mine and Oslo cluster bomb campaigns, building on the foundations that exist now in many countries, with Japan's well developed non-governmental organization (NGO) network a good example.
39. A new approach that the Commission believes particularly worthy of support is the creation and development of leadership networks of senior political, diplomatic and military leaders working together to coordinate national and international efforts toward multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Networks of this kind already exist within the UK — in the Top Level Group Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation — and the broader based new European Leadership Network which has grown from this. Their objectives include raising the level of awareness and the quality of debate on nuclear issues among parliamentarians, and improving public understanding of nuclear threats and policy choices.
40. The Commission welcomes these initiatives and encourages others in other regions around the world — in the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, and Africa — to develop such innovative mechanisms. Foundations for doing so already exist in the many statements that have been made by country groups of highly distinguished former political and military leaders, following the original example of the U.S. “four statesmen”, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn in their seminal Wall Street Journal articles. The ultimate goal is to help build a more receptive public climate and political maneuvering room for government leaders to take action on these issues: essentially, to ensure that the strategic aims and objectives that lie at the heart of this Commission's report, become mainstream political thinking around the world.
Dialogue with Industry
41. Given the need to ensure that any expanded use of civil nuclear energy not result in higher proliferation risks, the Commission supports a more intense dialogue between government and industry to ensure industry can be a partner in any future discussions for strengthening non-proliferation, as well as security and safety, regimes. A number of efforts to build such cooperation are already underway, and the Commission urges government and industry leaders to develop joint understandings of how they will further strengthen such cooperation in the future, and to communicate these actions to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.
Education and Training
42. Consistent with the action recommended in the NPT Final Document, the Commission strongly reiterates its belief that there should be a major renewal of emphasis on formal education and training about nuclear disarmament and related issues in schools and universities around the world, focusing on the history of nuclear weapons, the risks and threats involved in their continued deployment and proliferation, and possible ways forward. An associated need is for more specialized courses on nuclear-related issues — from the scientific and technical to the strategic policy and legal — in universities, diplomatic-training and related institutions. Here as elsewhere, knowledge by itself will not achieve a safer, saner and more civilized world, but it is a crucial precondition.
Vienna, 5 July 2010
Gareth Evans (Australia) (Co-chair)
Professor Evans was Australia's Resources and Energy Minister (1984-87) and Foreign Minister (1988-96). He initiated the Canberra Commission (1996) and was a member of the UN High-level Panel (2004), Blix Commission (2006) and Zedillo Commission on the IAEA (2008). He was President (2000-09) and is now President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group, and is currently the Chancellor of the Australian National University and an Honorary Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne.
Yoriko Kawaguchi (Japan) (Co-chair)
Ms Kawaguchi has been a Member of the House of Councillors for the Liberal Democratic Party since 2005. She was Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, responsible for foreign affairs (2004-05), Minister for Foreign Affairs (2002-04) and Minister for the Environment (2000-02). Previously she was a Managing Director of Suntory Ltd, a senior official at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Minister at the Embassy of Japan in the United States, and an economist at the World Bank.
Turki Al Faisal (Saudi Arabia)
HRH Prince Turki was Director General of Intelligence from 1977 to 2001, and Ambassador to the United Kingdom and Ireland from 2002 to 2005, and to the United States from 2005 to 2007. He is currently Chairman of the Board of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh.
Alexei Arbatov (Russia)
Dr Arbatov was a member of the Russian Duma and Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defence Committee from 1994 to 2003. He is currently a Scholar-in-Residence and Chair of the Non-proliferation Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway)
Dr Brundtland was Prime Minister of Norway for ten years between 1981 and 1996. She chaired the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) and was Director-General of the World Health Organization from 1998 to 2003. She is currently the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Climate Change.
Frene Noshir Ginwala (South Africa)
Dr Ginwala was Speaker of South Africa's National Assembly from 1994 to 2004. She was Chancellor of the University of KwaZulu-Natal from 2004 until June 2009.
François Heisbourg (France)
Mr Heisbourg is Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Special Adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and was a member of the French Presidential Commission that produced the 2008 Defence and National Security White Paper.
Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan)
General Karamat was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Army Staff between 1996 and 1998 and Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States from 2004 to 2006. He is currently Director of the Spearhead Research Institute.
Brajesh Mishra (India)
Mr Mishra was India's Ambassador in Geneva, Jakarta and then New York from 1973 to 1981, and National Security Adviser and Principal Secretary to former Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee from 1998 to 2004.
Klaus Naumann (Germany)
General Naumann was Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1996 to 1999 and Chief of the Defence Staff in Germany from 1991 to 1996. He was a Member of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (2000) and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001).
William Perry (United States)
Dr Perry was the US Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997. He is currently a Professor at Stanford University in the School of Engineering and the Institute for International Studiess.
Wang Yingfan (China)
Ambassador Wang was China's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 2000 to 2003, and Vice-Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress from 2003 to 2008.
Shirley Williams (United Kingdom)
Baroness Williams was Leader of the Liberal Democrat Party in the House of Lords from 2001 to 2004. She is currently Professor Emeritus of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and was an adviser to then Prime Minister Gordon Brown on nuclear proliferation issues.
Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (Indonesia)*
Ambassador Wiryono was Director-General of Political Affairs in Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs from 1990-1993. He has served as Indonesia's Ambassador to Australia, France and Austria, as Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna and on the Board of Governors for the IAEA.
Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico)
Dr Zedillo was President of Mexico from 1994 to 2000. He is currently Director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, and Professor at Yale University in international economics and politics.