Para 1.4: While the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was perhaps the best known nuclear near-miss, there were others, including the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. On 26 September 1983 – three weeks after the Soviets shot down a Korean passenger jet – a Russian computer malfunction caused it to appear as though the U.S. had launched a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the Russian officer in charge did not launch an immediate retaliatory strike. The story was confirmed not only by the officer himself, but a number of other sources. (Dateline, NBC, 12 November 2000.) A little later that same year, the Soviets also apparently believed that the U.S. and NATO had begun the countdown for a nuclear attack against the USSR, though again, when the decision was taken to wait, no attack eventuated. (Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996). Other nuclear near-misses and accidents are listed in Scott D. Sagan’s The Limits of Safety, Princeton University Press, 1993; and in Bruce G. Blair, “The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War”, Bulletin of Science Technology Society, Brookings Institution, 1996:16. On the threat of cyber terrorism in a nuclear context see Jason Fritz, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, ICNND Research Paper, May 2009. http://www.icnnd.org See further at 2.39. Para 1.14: UNSCR 1887 (S/RES/1887 (2009) of 24 September 2009, the product of the unprecedented summit-level meeting of the Council chaired by the U.S. President to consider nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrated support at the highest political level for progress on a wide range of current global nuclear issues. All three NPT pillars – nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses – are addressed but the resolution’s provisions on nuclear non-proliferation and security are more detailed, numerous and substantive than those on nuclear disarmament. For the most part the resolution did not break new ground, combining elements of many previous resolutions, but its provisions on NPT withdrawal, including a Security Council commitment to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal, were strong and significant.
Para 2.4: The references to ‘nuclear winter’ are drawn from a commissioned research paper by Steven Starr, “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict”, August 2009. http://www.icnnd.org Paras 2.8, 2.10, 2.11, 2.23 and 2.24: References to START in these paragraphs are to the START-I treaty. Para 2.25: Regarding the announcement of a possible cut in the number of UK nuclear submarines, see Gordon Brown’s statement to the UN General Assembly, 23 September 2009, http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page20719 Para 2.36: The UN Panel of Government Experts on Missiles (UNPGE) presented its most recent report in 2008 and concluded, among other things, that it was important to have continued international efforts to deal with the increasingly complex issue of missiles in the interest of international peace and security and to focus attention on existing and emerging areas of consensus. The Panel also emphasized the important role of the United Nations in providing a more structured and effective mechanism to build such a consensus. Para 2.39: Perry made these (as yet unpublished) comments at the Helsinki Conference on Nuclear Weapons, 23 October 2009. General: This Section drew on a paper prepared by Commissioner Alexei Arbatov, “Existing Nuclear-Armed States and Weapons”, August 2009. http://www.icnnd.org
|Notes to Box 2-2
1 Most estimates agree on a lower figure of approximately 2000 reserve strategic warheads. However, due to discrepancies between the U.S. “operationally deployed” counting method and START-1 counting rules, U.S. strategic force may have up to 3,000 reserve warheads which could be quickly deployed.
2 Based on lower estimate. The type and yield of weapons in the higher estimate is not known.
3 Most of the sources used in this table agree on a figure of around 2800. However, both the Carnegie Endowment (3113) and CDI (3300 – 3400) give higher estimates.
4 Rough approximation due to lack of transparency on this category of weapon. The same applies to the figure given for Russian non-strategic weapons. It is also not clear how many are reserve weapons, and how many are scheduled to be dismantled. All observers agree that there are “many thousands” in storage, but the numbers vary. The figures given are derived from the FAS and IISS statistics, which are credible.
5 China releases no official figures on its nuclear forces. The above figures are thus approximations made from available sources. The FAS gives a figure of approx. 180 strategic warheads, but notes that some of these may not be fully operational. It also suggests that there may be some additional warheads in storage, for a total stockpile of approximately 240 warheads. SIPRI agrees with this total but gives a specific figure of 186 deployed warheads, the remainder (54) being in storage.
6 China strongly denies having tactical nuclear weapons, though this is queried by a number of observers who suggest there may be between 150 and 350 of them.
|7 President Nicolas Sarkozy announced on 22 March 2008 that France would reduce the total number of nuclear warheads in its arsenal to under 300 in 2009, and that it would do so by removing a third of the weapons mounted on aircraft:
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/21/europe/EU-GEN-France-Nuclear.php Although by START-1 classification French aircraft would be counted as tactical or medium-range delivery vehicles, they are considered an arm of the French strategic strike force. Approximately 60 nuclear-armed air-to-surface missiles fall into this category, and are included in the Strategic list.
8 According to the FAS, France is thought to have a small inventory of spare warheads but no reserve of the sort that the United States and Russia have.
9 All sources used in this table agree the UK has “fewer than 160” nuclear warheads which are said to be “operationally available”. Forty-eight missiles are needed to arm three SSBNs with a maximum of 144 warheads. One submarine with “up to 48 warheads” is on patrol at any given time. In addition to the operationally available warheads, Britain probably has a small reserve.
10 Some warheads on British strategic submarines have sub-strategic missions previously covered by tactical nuclear weapons.
11 Israel maintains a policy of opacity as to whether it possesses nuclear weapons or not.
12 The arsenals of India, Pakistan and Israel are thought to be only partly deployed.
13 India and Pakistan release no official figures on their nuclear forces. The above figures are based on estimates derived from public statements by officials, media reports, projections made from analysis of known or suspected fissile material production and reserves, and data recorded at the time of the 1998 nuclear tests made by both countries. Indian atomic scientists were reported in September 2009 as saying that India had built weapons with yields of up to 200 kt.
14 North Korea conducted nuclear test explosions in October 2006 and May 2009. It is not publicly known if it has built operational nuclear weapons. The above figures are based on estimates of weapons-grade plutonium it may have produced and analysis of data recorded at the time of its nuclear tests. Some estimates suggest that plutonium reserves would be sufficient for twelve such weapons. North Korea has probably – although there are differing expert views on this – not yet been able to miniaturize any devices it may have produced sufficiently to allow their delivery by ballistic missile or aircraft.
Para 3.6: The quotation is from A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility—Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004, para 110. http://www.un.org/secureworld Para 3.10: “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, Report by the Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2009/35, 5 June 2009, http://isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_Iran_Report_5June2009.pdf Para 3.11: Considerable detail on the Khan case can be found in “A.Q. Khan and Onward Proliferation from Pakistan”, from Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, IISS 2007, Chapter 3. This also includes factors leading to the conclusion in the last sentence. Para 3.12: The Report mentioned is Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond, Report of the Commission of Eminent Persons chaired by Dr Ernesto Zedillo to the IAEA Director General, June 2008. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/PDF/2020report0508.pdf Paras 3.14–22 The paragraphs on surge risk draw on presentations by Dr Brad Roberts and Alexis Blanc, “Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests: Report of the Panel on Nuclear Proliferation”, U.S. Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study www.stimson.org/nuke/ppts/Roberts_Briefing_1-09.ppt and the Stanford study edited by William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova “In Search of Proliferation Trends and Tendencies” (in William C. Potter, Editor (with the assistance of Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2010). Para 3.14: The High-level Panel Report (supra) quotation is from para 111. The U.S. Congressional Commission on U.S. Strategic Posture warning about a nuclear “tipping point” is made is several places – pp. 11, 16, 20, 30 and 143, http://www.usip.org/files/America%27s_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf The ElBaradei comment was made during a media interview in May 2009. “IAEA chief sees nuclear states doubling: report”, Al Arabiya, 15 May 2009.http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/05 /15/zz72894.html Para 3.21: Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests: Report of the U.S. Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study, Volume II, Main Report, Washington DC December 2008, at p. 122 (Figure 3.3).
Para 4.10: The reference to ‘phantom’ states is drawn from an International Crisis Group paper “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State”, Africa Report No 136, 13 December 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=5259 Para 4.12: This paragraph drew on a paper prepared by Commissioner Alexei Arbatov, “Existing Nuclear-Armed States and Weapons”, August 2009. http://www.icnnd.org The source of the first estimate list in the paragraph was C.D. Ferguson and W.C. Potter, “Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear Terrorism”, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Research Paper No 2 (Stockholm, 2004,) p. 35. The source of the second estimate was Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons: Report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Stockholm 2006, p. 70, www.wmdcommission.org Paras 4.16–19: Drawn from an input paper prepared by Stephen McIntosh, Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation. Para 4.18: On the Argentina case see “Patagonia Crime Scene Plays role in Nuclear-Security Bid”, The Wall Street Journal, 9 October 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125504219290974603.html Para 4.19: UNGA Resolution A/RES/63/67. Paras 4.20 ff: On the potential threat of cyber terrorism see Jason Fritz, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, ICNND Research Paper, May 2009. http://www.icnnd.org Para 4.24: The works referred to in this paragraph are Graham T Allison, Owen R. Coté Jr., Richard A Falkenrath, and Steven E Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1996; Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Times Books, New York, 2004; Siegfried Hecker, “Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System: Keeping Fissile Materials out of Terrorists’ Hands”. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 607, September 2006, page(s) 121–132. Para 4.25: The works referred to in this paragraph are John Mueller, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood”, Paper prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, 15 January 2008; and Cass R. Sunstein, “The Case for Fear”, New Republic 11 December 2006: 29–33 at p.32. Para 4.26: The work referred to in this paragraph is Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, Harvard University Press, 2007 at p.7.
Para 5.2–3: World Nuclear Association, WNA Nuclear Century Outlook. Para 5.3: World Nuclear Association, World Power Reactors 2008–09 and Uranium Requirements, 1 October 2009. Para 5.4: The figures given for the likely expansion of nuclear power were drawn from Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008, p 60. Para 5.6: The references particularly to the issue of qualified personnel were drawn from Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2007, Paris, London, Brussels, Greens-EFA Group in the European Parliament, 2008, p 13; Sharon Squassoni, “Nuclear renaissance: is it coming? Should it?”, Policy Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, pp 2–3; Sharon Squassoni, Charles D. Ferguson, and Alan Hanson, Nuclear Energy, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control in the Next Administration: Is Nuclear Energy the Answer? Washington DC, 29 October 2008; Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008, pp 322–324. Para 5.10: The reference to ‘influential policy circles’ in the U.S. is drawn from International Security Advisory Board, Report on proliferation implications of the global expansion of civilian nuclear power, United States Department of State, 7 April 2008: http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/105587.pdf. Para 5.11: Some argue that LWR fuel may still be useful for producing fissile material if the state in control of the reactor is ‘bent on making bombs’: see Victor Gilinksy, “A fresh examination of the proliferation dangers of light water reactors”, in Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats, Ed. Henry Sokolski. Carlisle, PA, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. Para 5.12: Andrew Symon, “Nuclear power in Southeast Asia: implications for Australia and non-proliferation”, Lowy Institute Analysis, Sydney, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008; David Albright and Andrea Scheel, “Unprecedented projected nuclear growth in the Middle East: now is the time to create effective barriers to proliferation”, ISIS Report. Washington DC, 2008; Peter Crail and Jessica Lasky-Fink, “Middle East states seeking nuclear power”, Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, 11 June 2008: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_05/MiddleEastEnergy ; Jay Solomon, “U.S. and U.A.E. to sign nuclear-cooperation pact”, The Wall Street Journal, 13 December 2008. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122904102094400097.html
Para 6.1: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons can be found at http://www.lcnp.org/wcourt/opinion.htm It is discussed further in Section 20 Para 6.3: The Dulles quote is from Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 173. Para 6.10: George Perkovich, “Nuclear Zero: Key Issues to be Addressed”, Security Index Journal, Vol. 15, No. 3-4 (88–89), Summer/Fall 2009. Para 6.16: Bernard F.W. Loo, “The Terrible Allure of Nuclear Weapons”, RSIS Commentaries 87/2009, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, Singapore, 1 September 2009. Para 6.18: It has been argued on the basis of comments made by former Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz after the 1991 Gulf war that Iraq did not use its chemical weapons because it feared nuclear retaliation, whether from the U.S. or Israel. But there is little evidence to justify this claim, and many reasons to doubt it. Neither the U.S. nor Israel made explicit nuclear threats. The U.S. did warn against chemical use but the threatened response was largely about toppling the regime. And the Iraqis may not have used their chemical weapons for any one of a number of other reasons: their knowledge that Scud missiles lacked accuracy, the unavailability of artillery when and where needed, the knowledge that coalition forces were well protected against chemical attack, and the fear of individual force commanders that they would be tried for war crimes. Para 6.26: Dr Henry Kissinger, Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference (untitled), 6 February 2009, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&sprache=en&id=224&
Para 7.2: The Commission settled on “minimization point” as the best terminology for describing where we want to be by 2025. “Base camp” (as used by Sam Nunn, for example, in remarks made during his presentation of the first “Robert S. McNamara Lecture on War and Peace”, Harvard, 17 October 2008, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2008/10/nunn-wants-to-eliminate-nukes/ has its metaphorical attractions but implies still a long way to go rather than “one last push”: in the real world of mountain climbing, on Mt Everest for example, that still leaves on the south side Camps I–IV before the summit, and on the north side Camps I–VII. ‘Vantage point’ (as used by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn in their 15 January 2008 Wall Street Journal article “Toward a Nuclear-Free World”, similarly implies distance from the goal, when we wanted to imply real proximity. ‘Assembly station’/‘assembly point’ language, as in the D-Day landings jumping-off points on the English south coast, may be carrying the ‘final assault’ metaphor a bit far. And ‘basement’ conveys overtones for some that, if not trivial, may be more sinister than peaceful, as in ‘keeping a bomb in the basement’. Para 7.4: The average negotiating time of 3.5 years was derived from averaging out the time taken to negotiate the main bilateral and multilateral nuclear-related treaties from the 1980s onward: SALT I and II (3 and 7 years); START I and II (9 and 1); the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (3); the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement (2); the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (6 months); and the CTBT (3). In addition, a number of significant non-nuclear weapons treaties took an average of 3.3 years: the Chemical Weapons Convention (8); the Biological Weapons Convention (3); the Ottawa Landmines Convention (1); and the Oslo Cluster Munitions Convention (1.25). The overall average for these 12 treaties was 3.48 years. General: This section drew on George Perkovich, “Extended Deterrence on the Way to a Nuclear Free World”, May 2009; and Alexei Arbatov, “Existing Nuclear-Armed States and Weapons”, August 2009. These papers are available on http://www.icnnd.org
Para 8.4: There are 192 nations which are members of the United Nations, and a further two entities generally accepted as independent states (Kosovo and the Vatican) which are not UN members.
Para 9.6: The figures given for the Additional Protocol were correct as of mid-October 2009. The regularly updated list of Parties can be found at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.htm Para 9.8: The question of the IAEA’s powers was the subject of the report Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond, presented by the Commission of Eminent Persons chaired by Dr Ernesto Zedillo to the IAEA Director General in June 2008, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/PDF/2020report0508.pdf On compliance enforcement see James M. Acton, “Deterring Safeguards Violations”, Carnegie Policy Outlook, 2009. See also Pierre Goldschmidt, “Exposing Nuclear Non-compliance”, Survival, 51:1,143 – 164, 1 February 2009, and John Carlson, “NPT Safeguards Agreements – Defining Non-Compliance”, Arms Control Today, May 2009. Para 9.15: The reference to the IAEA setting the bar higher than its own standard safeguards agreements is to INFCIRC/153 para 19 which provides that a state may be found in non-compliance if the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion. Para 9.22: The relevant provision of the IAEA/Albania safeguards agreement INFCIRC/359 is Article 25(b)(i). The agreement was originally entered into in 1986, but reconfirmed in 2002. Para 9.23: The condition relating to continuation of safeguards on nuclear materials and equipment if a state terminates its safeguards agreements is contained in OP 20 of UNSCR 1887 (S/Res/1887 (2009)) which urges states to include this as a condition for any nuclear export contracts. Paras 9.24–28: References to strengthening the IAEA are drawn from the Zedillo Report supra.
Para 10.10: The question of general vs. specific operation support is discussed in Mark J.Valencia, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Glass Half Full”, Arms Control Today, June 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/Valencia
Para 11.2: These figures were given in “New impetus for test-ban treaty”, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol 15, Issue 6, August 2009. This paper provides an excellent summary of the issues on which this section has drawn substantially. Para 11.7: The Indian comment was made by Shyam Saran, the Indian Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Nuclear Issues and Climate Change, in Washington on 23 March 2009: “India links CTBT signing to nuclear disarmament”, The Times of India, 24 March 2009. Para 11.9: Details of the verification regime of the CTBT can be found on the website of the CTBT Organization http://www.ctbto.org Information in the last sentence is derived from U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, The National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2002. Para 11.11: The final sentence relating to very small nuclear explosions is drawn from Malcolm Coxhead, David Jepsen and Adam Yeabsley, “Putting the CTBT into practice”, CTBT Organization International Scientific Studies Conference, June 2009, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISS_2009/ISS09_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf at p. 140. Para 11.16: America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, Washington DC, 6 May 2009, at p.42, http://www.usip.org/files/America%27s_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf Para 11.17: See Bernard Sitt and Camille Grand, “Nuclear Stockpile Management: A Technical and Political Assessment”, ICNND Research Paper, http://www.icnnd/org
Para 12.19: The proposal was made by Robert J. Einhorn in his speech, “Controlling Fissile Materials and Ending Nuclear Testing, Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, made to the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo, 26–27 February 2008, http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/External_Reports/paper-einhorn.pdf General: This Section drew on “Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty: A Discussion”, by John Carlson, Director General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and member of the ICNND Advisory Board, 6 July 2009, www.icnnd.org
Para 13.1: For further details on the “5 Ps”, see Gareth Evans, “The Global Response to Terrorism”, Wallace Wurth Lecture, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 27 September 2005, http://gevans.org/speeches/speech122.html Para 13.2: On the Indonesian example, see for example International Crisis Group reports “Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso”, Asia Briefing N° 75, 22 January 2008 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5266&l=1; and “‘Deradicalisation’ and Indonesian Prisons”, Asia Briefing No 142, 19 November 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5170&l= Para 13.3: The objectives of the Global Initiative are contained in a White House Press Release, 15 July 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060715-2.htm Its statement of Principles can be found at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/75845.htm Para 13.5: The term ‘loose nukes’ was popularised by Graham Allison – see Graham T. Allison, Testimony to the (U.S.) Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 13 March 1996, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1996_h/s960313ksg.htm Para 13.8: For details of ITDB see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/itdb.html Para 13.10: See Senator Richard G. Lugar, “Revving Up The Cooperative Nonproliferation Engine”, The Nonproliferation Review, July 2008, Volume 15, No. 2, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol15/152_viewpoint_lugar.pdf; and two papers by Michael Krepon, “Prisms and Paradigms”, The Nonproliferation Review, March 2002, Volume 9, No. 1, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/91krep.pdf; and “The Mushroom Cloud that Wasn’t”, Foreign Affairs, May–June 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64995/michael-krepon/the-mushroom-cloud-that-wasnt Para 13.11: For European programs see Ian Anthony, Reducing Threats at the Source: A European Perspective on Cooperative Threat Reduction, SIPRI Research Report No. 19, Oxford University Press, 2004, http://books.sipri.org/files/RR/SIPRIRR19.pdf See also Stephen Pullinger and Gerrard Quille, “The European Union: Seeking Common Ground for Tackling Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 74, December 2003, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd74/74europe.htm
Para 14.4: Ambassador Tetsuya Endo, “Countries Planning to Introduce Nuclear Power Generation and the 3 Ss”, ICNND Research Paper www.icnnd.org Para 14.16: Prior to the India deal in 2008, Russia had been building two light water reactors in India since 2002, but based on a grandfathered agreement that preceded Russia’s membership of the NSG. Similarly, China sold reactors to Pakistan in 2000 before joining the NSG in 2004, and in 2005 based on a grandfathered contract. Israel has not developed a civilian nuclear energy sector. Para 14.18: On the WNA Charter of Ethics, see World Nuclear Association, “WNA Charter of Ethics”, 2008. http://www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/about/pdf/ WNA%20Charter%20of%20Ethics.pdf General: This Section drew on a commissioned research paper prepared by John Carlson, “Introduction to the Concept of Proliferation Resistance”, 3 June 2009, www.icnnd.org
15. Multilateralizing the Fuel-Cycle
Para 15.4: Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/640, 22 February 2005, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc640.pdf Para 15.8: Most recent evaluations of all fuel cycle proposals have counted twelve proposals: see Tariq Rauf and Zoroyana Vovchok, “Fuel for Thought”, IAEA Bulletin 49:2, March 2008.This report does not include the EU Non-Paper, which provides criteria for evaluating the proposals rather than a distinct multilateralization proposal. Para 15.10: World Nuclear Association, “Ensuring Security of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle”, May 2006, http://www.world-nuclear.org/reference/pdf/security.pdf Para 15.12: IAEA, “Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel”, Proposal to the IAEA from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Ireland, and the United States, 31 May 2006, IAEA GOV/INF/2006/10, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus /2006/cn147_ConceptRA_NF.pdfPara 15.14: IAEA, “Communication Received from Japan Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium”, INFCIRC/549/ Add.1/9 Date: 14 November 2006, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc549a1-9.pdf Para 15.16: IAEA, “Communication Dated 30 May 2007 From the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA Concerning Enrichment Bonds”, INFCIRC/707, 30 May 2007, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/
2007/infcirc707.pdf Para 15.20: IAEA, “Communication dated 28 September 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Agency”, INFCIRC/659, 28 September 2005, http://www.iaea.org/ Publications/ Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc659.pdf Para 15.21: Nuclear Threat Initiative Commits $50 Million to Create IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank”, IAEA/NTI Press Release, Vienna, 19 September 2006, http://nti.org/c_press/release_IAEA_fuelbank_091906.pdf Para 15.31: “Statement by Ambassador Valery Loshchinin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament”, Geneva, 31 January 2006, http://www.geneva.mid.ru/speeches/37.html Para 15.32: IAEA, “Communication received from the Resident Representative of the Russian Federation to the IAEA on the Establishment, Structure and Operation of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre”, INFCIRC/708, 8 June 2007. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc708.pdf See also Anya Loukianova, “The International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk: A Step Towards Assured Fuel Supply?” NTI Issue Brief, October 2007, updated November 2008. http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_93.html Para 15.34: GNEP was announced by U.S. President George W. Bush on “The President’s Radio Address”, 18 February 2006, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65275 See further U.S. Department of Energy, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: Industry involvement, 2008, http://www.gnep.energy.gov/afciparticipants/industryinvolvement.html Para 15.36: IAEA, “Communication received from the Resident Representative of Germany to the IAEA with regard to the German proposal on the Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle”, INFCIRC/704, 4 May 2007, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc704.pdf Para 15.38: IAEA, “Communication dated 26 May 2009 received from the Permanent Mission of Austria to the Agency enclosing a working paper regarding Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle”, INFCIRC/755, 2 June 2009, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc755.pdf General: This Section drew on an input paper, “Fuel Cycle Management”, prepared by Martine Letts, Deputy Director of the Lowy Institute, Sydney, and an ICNND Research Consultant.
Para 16.3: The original 13 steps can be found in para 15 of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/2000-NPT/pdf/FD-Part1and2.pdf Para 16.6: The New Agenda Coalition consists of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden. Regarding the current relevance of the 13 steps, see Sharon Squassoni, “Grading Progress on 13 Steps Toward Disarmament”, Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/13_steps.pdf See also the UN Secretary-General’s speech to the EastWest Institute conference “The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World”, delivered in New York, 24 October 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=351 ; and Hirafumi Nakasone, “Conditions towards Zero – 11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament”, Tokyo, 27 April 2009, http://www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/un/disarmament/arms/state0904.html Para 16.7: Regarding the reference to no one arguing for reaffirmation of the 13 steps without change, see Rebecca Johnson, “Enhanced Prospects for 2010: An Analysis of the Third PrepCom and the Outlook for the 2010 NPT Review Conference”, Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, June 09, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/Johnson Para 16.16: Existing nuclear weapon free zones were created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco 1967); the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga 1985); Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone treaty (Treaty of Bangkok 1995); African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba 1996); and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (Treaty of Semipalatinsk 2006). As mentioned in the paragraph, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty in effect establishes that continent as a NWFZ, banning nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste (Art. 5). In addition, Mongolia in 1992 unilaterally declared itself to be a NWFZ. Para 16.19: Discussion of a Middle East NWFZ drew on commissioned papers by two Members of the ICNND Advisory Board – Dr Shlomo Ben Ami, “Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: the Israeli Perspective”, and Ambassador Nabil Fahmy, “The Middle East Nuclear Paradigm and Prospects”, www.icnnd.org
Para 17.2: The suggestion of a UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament was drawn from an ICNND commissioned research paper by Professor John Langmore, “The possibility and potential value of holding a Fourth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament”, http://www.icnnd.org Para 17.8: The 80 per cent figure is given in a press report “New RF–U.S. agreement to replace START to be concluded before year end – FM”, Itar–TASS, Moscow, 3 September 2009, http:// www.itar-tass.com/txt/eng/level2.html; and also in the START I entry in Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/START_I Para 17.9: The figures given are drawn from the more detailed figures in Box 2-2. Para 17.21: See “Decision for the establishment of a Programme of Work for the 2009 session”, Conference on Disarmament, CD/1864, 29 May 2009 Para 17.36: The proposal for a UN Security Council Resolution was made in a commissioned paper prepared by Fahmy, Ambassador Nabil, “The Middle East Nuclear Paradigm and Prospects”, August 2009, http://www.icnnd.org Paras 17.51–61: These paragraphs were drawn from a number of reports by the International Crisis Group contained in “North Korea’s nuclear impasse”, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4985 and “Iran’s nuclear impasse” http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4984 See also IAEA, “Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)”, Report by the IAEA Director General, GOV/2009/45-GC(53)/13, 30 July 2009, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Documents/English/gc53-13_en.pdf ; and IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, Report by the IAEA Director General, GOV/2009/55, 28 August 2009, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf General: This Section draws on input papers prepared by ICNND Commissioners Alexei Arbatov, “Existing Nuclear-Armed States and Weapons”, and François Heisbourg, “The Medium Term Action Agenda to 2025: Reaching the Nuclear Risk Minimization Point”, http://www.icnnd.org
Para 18.26: The CTR figure is from the Nunn-Lugar scorecard found at http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar/The figure for dismantlement of Marcoule and Pierrelatte is contained in a French working paper submitted to the 2009 NPT PrepCom “Nuclear Disarmament: France’s Practical Commitment”, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.36, 13May 2009 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/336/62/PDF/N0933662.pdf?OpenElement. The actual and projected U.S. costs for dismantlement and verification under these two treaties can be found in “Economic Aspects of Conversion”, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/ethics/issues/military/economic-aspects-conversion.htm A similar figure is given in Stephen I. Schwartz, “Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940”, April 2008, http://www.ipb.org/AtomicAudit%20Schwartz%20presentation.pdf. General: This Section draws on input papers prepared by ICNND Commissioners Alexei Arbatov, “Existing Nuclear-Armed States and Weapons”, and François Heisbourg, “The Medium Term Action Agenda to 2025: Reaching the Nuclear Risk Minimization Point”, http://www.icnnd.org. See also George Perkovich, “Nuclear Zero: Key Issues To Be Addressed”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Security Index Journal, Vol. 15, No. 3-4 (88-89), Summer/Fall 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23719. On chemical weapons, see the Report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror; Freeing the World of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Blix Commission), Stockholm, 2006, http://www.wmdcommission.org
Para 19.3: The reference to public goods is drawn from the Report of the International Task Force on Global Public Goods 2006, chaired by Ernesto Zedillo, http://www.gpgtaskforce.org/bazment.aspx?page_id=268#bazAnchor Para 19.7: The references in this para were drawn from Professor Andrew Mack, Global Security Report, Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia, 17 October 2005, http://www.humansecurityreport.info/ index.php?option=content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=63; and from the summaries of the Mack group’s important findings given in various speeches given by Gareth Evans when President of the International Crisis Group (see, e.g., http://www.gevans.org/ speeches/speech310.html) and in his recent book, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2008, at pp.233-5. Para 19.11: The dead-end reference is drawn from George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, cited immediately below, p.291. General: This Section draws on two papers by Perkovich and Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons”, IISS Adelphi Paper 396, 2008, http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/adelphi-papers-2008/abolishing-nuclear-weapons/; and, as editors, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22748
Para 20.3: This draws on Chapter 10 “Mobilizing Political Will” in Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2008. Para 20.4: George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, The Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007; and “Toward a Nuclear-Free World”, The Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008. See also “Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb. It Won’t Be Easy, but a World Free of Nuclear Weapons is Possible” by former UK Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and for Defence, Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson (who was also NATO Secretary-General), The Times, 30 June 2008; “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons” by Italian statesmen former Prime Minister Italy Massimo D’Alema, Speaker of the Italian Chamber of Deputies Gianfranco Fini, former Minister of European Affairs Giorgio La Malfa, former Minister of Defence Arturo Parisi, and Secretary-General of the Pugwash Conference Professor Francesco Calogero, Corriere Della Sera, 24 July 2008; “Toward a Nuclear-Free World: a German View” by German statesmen former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, former President Richard von Weizsäcker, former Federal Minister for Special Affairs Egon Bahr, and former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, International Herald Tribune, 9 January 2009; “A Nuclear Weapon Free World”, by former Norwegian Prime Ministers Kjell Magne Bondevik, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Odvar Nordli and Kåre Willoch, and former Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, Oslo Aftenposten, 4 June 2009; “Pour un désarmement nucléaire mondial, seule réponse à la prolifération anarchique” by French former Prime Ministers Alain Juppé and Michel Rocard, former Defence Minister Alain Richard, and former Commander of the French Air Combat Force Bernard Norlain, in Le Monde, 15 October 2009, http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/ article/2009/10/14/pour-un-desarmement-nucleaire-mondial-seule-reponse-a-la-proliferation-anarchique_1253834_0.html; and Australian former statesmen, scientists, senior military officers and NGO campaigners, respectively Malcolm Fraser, Gustav Nossal, Barry Jones, Peter Gration and John Sanderson, and Tilman Ruff, “It’s time to get serious about ridding the world of nuclear weapons”, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 April 2009. Para 20.14: In his speech “World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, at the United Nations General Assembly on 9 June 1988 Rajiv Gandhi urged “the international community to immediately undertake negotiations with a view to adopting a time-bound Action Plan to usher in a world order free of nuclear weapons and rooted in nonviolence”, http://www.indianembassy.org/ policy/Disarmament/disarm15.htm. Creative as this was, it unintentionally served to polarize disarmament advocates and distract states into an argument as to whether deadlines should be imposed or whether nuclear disarmament would happen naturally at its own pace. Para 20.23: As listed above in 16.6, the New Agenda Coalition consists of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden, and South Africa. The members of the Seven Nation Initiative are Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Para 20.28: See generally Randy Rydell, “The Future of Nuclear Arms: A World United and Divided by Zero – Getting to Zero: Some Recent Initiatives”, Arms Control Today, April 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_04/Rydell Pugwash nuclear-related documents can be found at http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/nwlist.htm The Nuclear Security Project was set up by Messrs Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn to pursue their initiative. Details can be found at http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/site/c.mjJ
XJbMMIoE/b.3483737/k.4057/Nuclear_Security_Project_Home.htm Global Zero, a “campaign for the phased, verified elimination of nuclear weapons”, was launched in Paris, December 2008, http://www.globalzero.org/en/about-campaign The Middle Power Initiative now operates under the aegis of the Global Security Institute, which also set up the Article VI Forum. Further details can be found at http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/ The International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe was a Russian Initiative in 2007 and has held several meetings since then – see http://luxembourgforum.org/eng/ Details about ICAN can be found on its website at www.icanw.org/ Mayors for Peace was launched by the Mayor of Hiroshima in 1982. As of 1 October, 2009, membership stood at 3,147 cities in 134 countries and regions – see http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/index.html See also the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Declaration of Nobel Peace Laureates, 17 May 2009, http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/mediacenter_d/en/hiroshima-nagasaki/ Para 20.33: See further the ICNND research paper by Patricia M. Lewis, “A New Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: Learning from International Humanitarian Law Success”, January 2009, www.icnnd.org See also J. Borrie and A. Thornton, “The Value of Diversity in Multilateral Disarmament Work”, UNIDIR, United Nations, December 2008, ISBN: 978-92-9045-193-8 Para 20.37: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons can be found at http://www.lcnp.org/wcourt/opinion.htm Para 20.38: International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, International Network of Engineers and Scientists against Proliferation and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Securing Our Survival (SOS):The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention – The Updated Model Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on their Elimination, Cambridge, Mass., 2007. This is accessible at the website of ICAN, www.ican.org , which has been actively promoting the draft convention. Costa Rica/Malaysia transmission letter: UNGA A/62/650. See also Tim Wright, “Negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention: Distant Dream or Present Possibility?”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol 10, 2009. Para 20.43: “Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: Legal, technical and political elements required for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-free world”, Working Paper submitted by Malaysia, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Nicaragua, and Yemen to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.41. http://daccessdds.un.org/ doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/348/17/PDF/N0534817.pdf
OpenElemen Paras 20.45 ff: See two research papers by ICNND Research Coordinator Ken Berry, “A Draft Convention Prohibiting the Use or the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons”, and “Draft Treaty on the Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons”, April 2009, both at http://www.iccnnd.org Para 20.45: In 1961 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1653 (XVI) (55–20–26) which declared the use of nuclear weapons “a crime against mankind and civilization”. The Assembly also requested that the UN Secretariat sound out members on the idea of convening a conference to negotiate a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons. However, these soundings were inconclusive and no such conference was ever convened. The Narayanan reference was made in “Non-Proliferation, Arms control and future of nuclear weapons; is zero possible?”, Munich Security Conference, 6 February 2009, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=227& See also Jozef Goldblatt, “Prospects for a Ban on the Use of Nuclear Weapons”, Arms Control and Disarmament, No. 51, Center for Security Studies, Zurich, 1999, http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=9E854A8F-7D05-B418-482B-D249B34EDCEF&lng=en Para 20.50: Compare with the proposal made by Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center, “Getting to Zero”, 9 February 2009, www.stimson.org, in which, “to generate near-term traction for nuclear disarmament”, a “distinguished panel might list the menu of immediate actions required of states – nuclear, non-nuclear, and hedgers – to match words with deeds. ...[D]oing nothing would warrant a failing grade.” For the Space Security Index, see www.spacesecurity.org. Para 20.53: Such a model already exists, e.g. with the Global Centre on the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), www.globalr2p.org, recently established in New York – with the support of a number of governments and foundations – to act as a research and advocacy centre for governments, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations worldwide on the issue of mass atrocity crimes (genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes) in the aftermath of the UN General Assembly’s embrace of the “responsibility to protect” concept at the 2005 World Summit. The Centre is itself quite small in terms of the number of professionals directly employed, but works with a number of associated research centres around the world. The GCR2P also has an International Advisory Board, again drawn from a worldwide pool of senior, experienced and well-known figures in this area: it does not directly govern or take responsibility for the work of the Centre, but on a different organizational model such a board could, and indeed usually does.